La agencia técnica animal: hacia una explicación de las conductas de uso y fabricación de herramientas

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2446

Palabras clave:

agencia, uso y fabricación de herramientas, cuervos y chimpancés, planes de acción, representación motora

Resumen

En este trabajo examino la noción de “agencia” y su posible aplicación a la técnica animal. Aunque la teoría clásica de la acción considera que los animales no-humanos no pueden ser agentes debido a su carencia de lenguaje, los estudios de caso centrados en la capacidad de uso y fabricación de herramientas sugieren que algunos animales pueden tener habilidades técnicas complejas. ¿Podrían los animales ser considerados agentes técnicos? En este trabajo propongo un modelo explicativo para entender la capacidad técnica de algunos animales como los cuervos y los chimpancés. Aplicando los conceptos de representación motora y planes de acción, defiendo la idea de que ciertos animales deben ser considerados como agentes técnicos en la medida en que éstos son capaces de usar y fabricar ciertas herramientas de acuerdo a planes mentales de acción. Esto se debe a que los animales son capaces de representar objetos y actuar en concordancia de sus representaciones mentales, a pesar de no poseer un lenguaje articulado ni conceptos expresados proposicionalmente. Finalmente, concluyo que existe una técnica por fuera del ámbito humano.

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Publicado

2019-10-04

Cómo citar

Mejía Rendón, J. S. (2019). La agencia técnica animal: hacia una explicación de las conductas de uso y fabricación de herramientas. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 19(38). https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2446