Teorías científicas "aproximadamente verdaderas"
Un análisis semántico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.4472Palabras clave:
realismo y antirrealismo científicos, grados de falsedad, análisis del lenguaje, aproximación a la verdad, realismo científico semántico, semántica bivalente, principio del tercero excluidoResumen
Usualmente se acepta que un enunciado, o bien es verdadero, o bien es falso, y no hay otra alternativa. Sin embargo, en filosofía de la ciencia se habla de teorías científicas verdaderas o aproximadamente verdaderas, lo que parece sugerir que la expresión aproximadamente verdadera es un tercer valor de verdad, pues no parece tener el mismo significado que falsa ni que verdadera, y es formulada como alternativa a un valor de verdad. Como sea, su significado no parece estar claro y, de hecho, ha sido usada tanto para denotar teorías consideradas verdaderas (parcialmente o en alguna medida) como teorías consideradas falsas (aunque no completamente). Este artículo analiza el significado de la expresión y si su uso está justificado. Se concluye que, dados los significados de verdadero y de falso que usa el mismo lenguaje que la formula, no lo está.
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