Identidad, tiempo y cambio

disolviendo el problema de la identidad diacrónica

Autores/as

  • Cristian Lopez Universidad de Buenos Aires Université de Lausanne CONICET

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2408

Palabras clave:

identidad diacrónica, tetradimensionalismo, tridimensionalismo, relatividad especial, tiempo

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. En primer lugar, argumentaré que el problema de la identidad diacrónica es un problema subsidiario de asumir, por un lado, una posición ontológica en particular respecto de la constitución de los objetos físicos, el tridimensionalismo, y por el otro, y estrechamente relacionado, de asumir el presentismo como metafísica del tiempo. Mostraré que, asumiendo una ontología tetradimensional y el eternalismo, el problema naturalmente se disuelve. En segundo lugar, mostraré que tenemos sólidos motivos empíricos para favorecer el tetradimensionalismo a la luz de la física contemporánea, en particular, de la teoría especial de la relatividad.

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Publicado

2018-11-07

Cómo citar

Lopez, C. (2018). Identidad, tiempo y cambio : disolviendo el problema de la identidad diacrónica. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 19(38). https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2408