Los experimentos mentales como modelos científicos


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Palabras clave

experimentos mentales
modelos
idealización
límites ideales
representación científica

Cómo citar

Mettini, G. (2020). Los experimentos mentales como modelos científicos. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 20(40), 199-223. https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v20i40.3237

Resumen

El propósito de este trabajo es proporcionar una explicación novedosa sobre el funcionamiento de los experimentos mentales en física. Propongo que gracias a esta clase de experimentos es posible realizar inferencias acerca del comportamiento de los fenómenos y extraer conclusiones que explican aspectos del mundo físico a partir de la teoría relevante. Los escenarios imaginarios describen casos idealizados que funcionan como límites ideales de los fenómenos concretos. Este punto de vista asume un compromiso realista mínimo que reside en afirmar que los experimentos mentales representan aspectos del mundo porque permiten obtener conocimiento aproximadamente verdadero acerca de los fenómenos físicos o, en otras palabras, los experimentos mentales representan porque Las conclusiones que se infieren del modelo se aplican a sistemas reales.

https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v20i40.3237
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Referencias

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