Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
Vol. XXI # 42 RCFC
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Palabras clave

bribery
construct validity
lab experiments
trust
norms soborno
validez de constructo
experimentos de laboratorio
normas

Cómo citar

Senci, C. M. (2021). Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 21(42). https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v21i42.3252

Resumen

El constructo de soborno que emplean los estudios experimentales sobre corrupción enfrenta tres desafíos interrelacionados. En primer lugar, la noción de confianza empleada en el constructo de soborno reduce la misma a un mero cálculo de riesgo. En segundo lugar, y como consecuencia de lo anterior, el contexto apropiado de interacción se encuentra indeterminado. Por último, los experimentos presentan una insuficiente explicitación del marco normativo. En resumen, los investigadores sobre corrupción deben ser conscientes de los desafíos del constructo que emplean en el laboratorio y deben abordar los problemas antes mencionados para no comprometer la validez de sus resultados.

https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v21i42.3252
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