¿QUÉ ES EL REALISMO ESTRUCTURAL ÓNTICO?: UNA APROXIMACIÓN AL DEBATE ACTUAL SOBRE EL REALISMO CIENTÍFICO
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v13i27.1636Resumen
El Realismo Estructural ha nacido como una posición promisoria capaz de conciliar
las intuiciones que subyacen a los argumentos más influyentes que han esgrimido los
realistas y antirrealistas científicos, pretendiendo así instaurarse como una posición que
reúne lo mejor de ambos mundos. Las dificultades que sus formulaciones iniciales han
tenido para afrontar las objeciones de los críticos han llevado a algunos a profundizar
los supuestos que sostienen al Realismo Estructural, convirtiendo sus tesis epistémicas
en compromisos ontológicos: la ciencia conoce solamente la estructura del mundo inobservable,
porque nada más hay por conocer. Así, el Realismo Estructural Óntico aboga
por una reconceptualización metafísica de los objetos en términos puramente estructurales,
proyecto que se le ha imputado falencias tanto conceptuales como metodológicas.
El presente trabajo reconstruye los principales argumentos que sustentan esta posición,
ofrece una clasificación para las variantes que ha mostrado en la literatura reciente,
y emprende una revisión crítica de las principales objeciones que se han alzado en su
contra, mostrando que se trata de una posición tanto metodológica como conceptualmente
sostenible.
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