Diatribes on Scientific Rationality

Keys to a speculative understanding of debt and intellectual distance of Feyerabend about Popper

Authors

  • Teresa Gargiulo Universidad Nacional de Cuyo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v16i33.1933

Keywords:

Feyerabend, Popper, Science, Demarcation Criterion, Metaphysics

Abstract

The discussions that Paul Feyerabend held with Popper, allowed him to discover the flaws and limitations of an univocal notion of scientific rationality. Feyerabend realized how those mythical or metaphysical elements –that Popper recognized as pre-scientific– constitute, paradoxically, the heart of the scientific work. This criticism to Popper allowed him understands, imperfectly, what is not science and, therefore, the need to undertake a new vision or theory of science. Then, these discussions with Popper show him the way or the direction in which he should think his positive understanding of science. His understanding of the science is nothing but an attempt to refute dialectically the Popper ´s project to define science as opposed to metaphysics. Our purpose is to analyze the intellectual debt and subsequent detachment of Feyerabend regarding Popper, from his progressive understanding of scientific rationality.

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Published

2016-11-29

How to Cite

Gargiulo, T. (2016). Diatribes on Scientific Rationality: Keys to a speculative understanding of debt and intellectual distance of Feyerabend about Popper. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 16(33), 17–46. https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v16i33.1933

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