Are Valid Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Against Creacionist Cognitive Science of Religion?

Abstract

According to Plantinga, identifying the cognitive mechanisms (postulated by the cognitive science of religion (SCR) to explain the belief in God) with the sensus divinitatis allows us to build a case for the rationality of theism, and even one for its truth. The aim of this paper is to show how the creacionist cognitive science of religion (CRSCR) argument for theism can be undermined, using two Debunking Evolutionary Arguments (DEA) inspired by Hume. DEA against the rationality of religious belief start from the claim that such belief is caused by processes that do not track the truth, and come to the conclusion that this belief is unwarranted or even false. Hume develops a DEA based on the idea of motivated irrationality and illusion of control, and a DEA based on religious diversity, both of which aim to show that such mechanisms are not reliable in generating theistic belief. I will argue that these two arguments pose serious problems to advocates of the externalist rationality of theism, and that Plantinga's appeal to the epistemic effects of sin (to justify the malfunction of the sensus divinitatis and deal with the AED), fails for various reasons and because it is possible to develop a logical defeater argument against the CRSCR.