Our parents’ (historiographical) sins Or how a virtuous relationship became vicious… and how to redeem it
Or how a virtuous relationship became vicious… and how to redeem it
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v18i37.2567Keywords:
History of Science, Philosophy of Science, Kitcher, Laudan, Kuhn, Dynamic EpistemologyAbstract
In this paper I present a diagnosis of a problem and a solution proposal (currently in progress). This problem revolves around how we should understand the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science in such a way that both disciplines achieve an adequate and balanced integration. My diagnosis is based on four analyses that Philip Kitcher, Larry and Rachel Laudan and Thomas Kuhn have made over the last two decades. My diagnosis takes the basic ideas common to these four authors and adds seven points related to the logic of Dewey and some ideas of Peirce. My proposal is that a more harmonious and potentially fertile integration between history of science and philosophy of science lies in conceiving such integration as a dynamic epistemology of four epistemic fields (emergence, preservation, modification, change) about multiple cognitive phases (questions, data, approach to problems, beliefs, reasoning, results) characteristic of scientific research practices. This dynamic epistemology must account not only for the justification of epistemic areas and cognitive phases, but also for their relevance.
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