Animals, Ethology and Philosopy

Abstract

The question of animal subjectivity combines philosophical and ethological research. In this essay I have faced the problem with a philosophical ethology approach. I believe it is wrong to attribute subjectivity to conscience, for two reasons: 1. it is a petitio principii which does not explain the subjective condition; 2. does not consider the high subjectivity of the unconscious. If consciousness is like a light that illuminates cognitive processes, subjectivity, as result of the individual's inner world, precedes consciousness. My proposal is based on a new model of animality that challenges the Cartesian vision of animal machine, governed by automatisms. The innate and learned endowments must be considered tools, available to the individual, not automatisms that move him. This means applying a schema model as opposed to the traditional associative model. This transformation makes the individual user and not a slave to his endowments. The scheme model, like the map of a city, allows more functions and gives the individual the possibility to generate new uses to face novelty situations. It also responds to Morgan's canon of parsimony, because it allows the use of the same device for multiple functions and as a heuristic to make targeted attempts in solution processes. Subjectivity is then the ability to immerse oneself in situations, using endowments as tools to enter into a relationship with the world. Subjectivity is Heidegger's Dasein, an ontological quality that characterizes animality. This quality arises from the desiring nature of the animal, which continually leads it to enter into a relationship with its surroundings, hybridizing with external reality. Desire arises from the condition of "being a body" and cannot be assigned to a particular body function. Being desiring makes the animal an entity in continuous transformation, never thinkable in a static way, because it always tends to overcome itself.