Scientific realism and antirealism, stances in disagreement
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v23i46.3809Keywords:
scientific realism, social epistemology, deep disagreement, epistemic peersAbstract
In this article, we propose to redefine the positions that take part in the debate between scientific realism and antirealism, ceasing to conceive them solely as doctrines or theories that describe how the world is like. Instead, following the path initiated by van Fraassen in The empirical stance, we choose to define them as stances: policies, strategies or perspectives from which we build factual beliefs. Thus, in first place we are dedicated to understand what a stance is and how to characterize this notion. Second, we explore methodologies and approaches to treat realism and antirealism as stances, and in this key, define them appropriately. Finally, we examine the impact of this proposal in explaining the agreements and disagreements in the debate, evaluating the degrees of affinity or distance in the perspectives at stake.
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