Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Cómo citar

Martinez-Ordaz, M. del R. (2019). Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?. Revista Colombiana De Filosofía De La Ciencia, 19(38).


Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some scientific realists to weaken their philosophical theses with respect to the success of science. Some of them have suggested that a satisfactorily realist standpoint should be a highly modest approach to scientific success , leaving many with the impression that scientific realism nowadays is nothing that we once thought it was. In light of that, the main concern of this paper is methodological, here I want to answer the question how far can we push the boundaries of our realist commitments and still be in control of our philosophical claims. In particular, I deal with the issue of how a certain type of weak version of selective realism will necessarily allow for true contradictions, dialetheias –even if that is not desirable. Here I argue that if one presents a very weak characterization of selective realism, one that is in line with contemporary projects, this type of realism will not forbid the possibility of things such as dialetheias. I also claim that, if that is the case, we face the following dilemma: or our general characterization of selective realism is mistaken or selective realists cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why and how to forbid dialetheias in science


BROWN, Bryson Brown (1990), “How to be realistic about inconsistency in science” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21 (2); p.p. 281-294.

CHAKRAVARTTY, A. (2017a) "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition).

------------------------------(2017b) “Reflections on new thinking about scientific realism”, Synthese 194 (9):3379-3392.

DAVEY, K. (2014): “Can good science be logically inconsistent?”, VICKERS y BUENO, eds., Is Science Inconsistent?, Synthese 191 (13): 3009-3026.

ESTRADA-GONZÁLEZ, L. (2014) “On the Possibility of Realist Dialetheism” SATS 15 (2):197-217. HEMPEL, C. (1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Nueva York: Free Press.

--------------- (2000): Selected Philosophical Essays, R. Jeffrey, ed., Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.

KITCHER, P. (2015): “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth”

KUHN, T. (1977): The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press.

LAKATOS, I. y A. Musgrave, eds. (1970): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge; Cambridge University Press.

LAUDAN, L. (1977). Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, University of California Press.

MEHEUS, J., ed. (2002): Inconsistency in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

-------------------- (2002a): “How to reason sensibly yet naturally from Inconsistencies”, MEHEUS, ed., 2002, pp. 151-164.

POPPER, K. (1959): The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Nueva York: Routledge, 2009.

PRIEST, G. (2002): “Inconsistency in the empirical sciences”, in MEHEUS, ed., 2002, pp.119-128. PSILLOS, S (1999): Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London: Routledge.

PUTNAM, H. (1975): Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SAATSI, J (2014): “Inconsistency and scientific realism”, VICKERS y BUENO, eds., Is Science Inconsistent?, Synthese 191 (13): 2941- 2955.

----------------(2017) ‘Replacing recipe realism’, Synthese 194 (9):3233-3244.

SMITH, J. (1988): “Inconsistency and scientific reasoning”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (4): 429-445.

TRIZIO, E. (2015) “Scientific Realism and the Contingency of the History of Science” en Science as It Could Have Been: Discussing the Contingency/Inevitability Problem, University of Pittsburg Press; p. 129-150.

VICKERS, P. (2013), Understanding Inconsistent Science, Oxford University Press.

-------------------(2014). “Scientific theory eliminativism”, Erkenntnis 79 (1): 111-126.

-------------------(2015) “Contemporary Scientific Realism and the 1811 Gill Slit Prediction”

-------------------(2016) ‘Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI’, Synthese, First Online. DOI:10.1007/s11229-015-0962-3.

VICKERS, P. y J. Saatsi (2011): “Miraculous Success?Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory”, British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 62: 29–46.


Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.