Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2411Keywords:
Selective Realism, contradiction, dialetheia, pessimistic, Meta-InductionAbstract
Selective Realism is the most-common ‘type’ of scientific realism. It groups many diverse approaches to science, theories, and truth, and so, it is very difficult to define it with precision. Yet, there are three elements which, allegedly, suffice for a general characterization of this view, namely: a Non-Miracles Argument motivation, a Pessimistic Meta-Induction motivation and selectivity. I contend that such characterization is not robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. In particular, I argue that such characterization prevents selective realists from blocking the possibility of true contradictions, dialetheias, even if they are not desirable.
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